Testimony in a trial related to Turkey’s July 15, 2016 coup attempt has provided new details about private meetings held the previous evening among then Chief of General Staff Gen. Hulusi Akar, National Intelligence Organization (MİT) Undersecretary Hakan Fidan and Special Forces Commander Lt. Gen. Zekai Aksakallı.
Turgay Usanmaz, a chief master sergeant who served on the protection detail of Special Forces Chief of Staff Erdinç Kocayanak, gave an account consistent with earlier statements by Senior Sgt. Mehmet Bilge and Col. Fırat Alakuş concerning the July 14 meetings.
Critics say the meetings raise questions about what Turkey’s top military and intelligence officials knew before the coup attempt began. The officials have not been accused in court of planning or participating in the attempt.
According to the accounts, the final 48 hours before Aksakallı returned to Special Forces headquarters contain several events that have not been fully explained.
The chronology presented by the writer is as follows:
THURSDAY, JULY 14, 2016
A graduation ceremony for a military specialization course was held at the Special Forces Command’s Oğulbey Barracks in Gölbaşı, Ankara.
The ceremony departed from previous practice in several respects.
It was moved from Friday to Thursday, reportedly because Akar planned to attend. Under military custom, such ceremonies were usually attended by the deputy chief of General Staff rather than the chief of General Staff.
Fidan also attended the ceremony.
A protocol dinner was scheduled for 8 p.m. After the ceremony, Akar and Fidan reportedly left the main table and sat alone at another table.
According to testimony cited by the writer, they held a private conversation lasting about three and a half hours.
Deputy Chief of General Staff Gen. Yaşar Güler left the barracks while the meeting was still underway. Akar departed at around 11:30 p.m., but Fidan remained.
After Akar left, Fidan reportedly held another private meeting with Aksakallı outside the building. That meeting lasted nearly an hour, according to the accounts.
The substance of the meetings has not been publicly explained in detail.
FRIDAY, JULY 15, 2016
Around noon: Brig. Gen. Semih Terzi, commander of the 1st Special Forces Brigade in Silopi, called Aksakallı and requested permission to travel to Ankara because of his father’s illness.
Aksakallı approved the request and told Terzi that a military cargo plane scheduled to travel to Cizre could transport him.
2 p.m.: A counterterrorism meeting began at General Staff headquarters. The meeting was chaired by Güler and attended by Aksakallı.
2:20 p.m.: Pilot Maj. O.K., who served at the Army Aviation School Command, arrived at MİT headquarters to report suspicious military activity.
According to the official chronology, Fidan called Güler about two hours later. Güler then informed Akar.
Fidan arrived at General Staff headquarters at 6:10 p.m. and met with Akar, Güler and Land Forces Commander Gen. Salih Zeki Çolak.
At 6:30 p.m., the military issued an order prohibiting military flights.
The counterterrorism meeting reportedly continued until 7 p.m., although Güler and Çolak had left.
7:15 p.m.: The CASA military cargo plane mentioned by Aksakallı was prepared for departure, but the flight was canceled.
8:15 p.m.: Aksakallı and his wife attended a wedding at the Beştepe Gazi Officers’ Club.
Around 8:30 p.m.: Military units accused of participating in the coup attempt began moving, and the first alerts were issued from General Staff headquarters. The alert also reached Special Forces headquarters.
8:50 p.m.: Col. Ümit Tatan, commander of the Etimesgut Air Regiment, called the pilots of the cargo plane whose flight had been canceled and authorized them to take off.
The authorization was issued despite the earlier military flight ban.
9 p.m.: Appointment and martial law directives sent from General Staff headquarters reached the Special Forces Command.
The directives said Terzi had been appointed commander of the Special Forces and that Aksakallı had been removed.
9:20 p.m.: A 33-member Special Forces team entered General Staff headquarters. Members of the team were later accused of detaining senior military commanders.
9:22 p.m.: The cargo plane departed from the Etimesgut Air Regiment for Diyarbakır. According to the account, air traffic controllers did not prevent its departure.
9:30 p.m.: Aksakallı left the wedding with his wife.
According to Aksakallı’s testimony, a Mercedes Vito blocked his vehicle shortly afterward, and two armed men attempted to abduct him. Aksakallı said he kicked one man in the leg and escaped.
Around 10:15 p.m.: Aksakallı called Lt. Col. Ümit Koçak, the duty officer at the Special Forces Command, and requested an armored vehicle and a protection team to escort him to the barracks.
He reportedly gave the order: “Only allow Semih Terzi inside. Do not let anyone else enter.”
Five minutes later, Aksakallı called Special Forces Chief of Staff Kocayanak and Staff Col. Ömer Faruk Bozdemir, commander of the Special Forces school, and ordered them to go to headquarters and take control.
At around the same time, Terzi left Silopi by helicopter for Diyarbakır, where he was to board the cargo plane to Ankara.
11:15 p.m.: The plane landed in Diyarbakır.
Aksakallı, who reportedly considered his own home unsafe, went to the residence of another general at the Special Forces Sports School housing complex. He waited there for the armored vehicle and protection team.
11:30 p.m.: Terzi arrived in Diyarbakır.
11:39 p.m.: The protection vehicle sent for Aksakallı came under attack, preventing him from meeting the team.
Aksakallı then called MİT official Kemal Eskintan and requested weapons and ammunition for personnel being sent to regain control of the Special Forces barracks. According to the account, MİT approved the request.
11:59 p.m.: The plane carrying Terzi departed for Ankara without being stopped.
SATURDAY, JULY 16, 2016
1:11 a.m.: With assistance from MİT official Sadık Üstün, Aksakallı appeared live on TGRT television. At 1:47 a.m., he appeared on NTV.
He said the coup attempt was taking place outside the military chain of command and described it as a treacherous uprising.
According to the account, Aksakallı also discussed calling civilians into the streets with then Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım.
He later arranged television appearances by several senior commanders, including Gendarmerie Public Security Corps Commander Lt. Gen. İsmail Metin Temel, 8th Corps Commander Lt. Gen. Yılmaz Uyar, 7th Corps Commander Lt. Gen. İbrahim Yılmaz and 6th Mechanized Infantry Division Commander Maj. Gen. Osman Erbaş.
At the same time, Aksakallı attempted to contact Noncommissioned Officer Ömer Halisdemir, who had served on his protection detail for three years.
Aksakallı called Halisdemir eight times, told him that Terzi was a traitor and ordered him to kill the general, according to testimony.
“Yes, sir,” Halisdemir reportedly replied.
2:05 a.m.: The cargo plane carrying Terzi landed at Etimesgut despite the flight ban. The aircraft was not stopped by radar or air traffic personnel, according to the account.
Terzi and the personnel accompanying him boarded helicopters for the Oğulbey Barracks.
Capt. Ahmet Kemal Yılmaz, commander of one of the teams, remained at Etimesgut.
2:14 a.m.: The helicopter landed at the barracks.
As Terzi walked toward the headquarters building, Halisdemir shot him from behind.
Members of Terzi’s team opened fire on Halisdemir. Terzi was transported by helicopter to Gülhane Military Medical Academy.
Halisdemir was severely wounded but remained alive. According to witness accounts, medical personnel were checking his condition when First Lt. Mihrali Atmaca drew his pistol and shot Halisdemir twice in the chest, killing him.
Around the same time, Yılmaz, who had remained at Etimesgut, contacted Aksakallı and said he was at his command and had personnel he trusted among the team inside the barracks.
According to the writer, Atmaca was among the personnel Yılmaz considered reliable.
From that point, Aksakallı reportedly relayed orders to personnel inside the barracks through Yılmaz and Atmaca.
3:10 a.m.: Atmaca and other team members began detaining personnel accused of participating in the coup attempt on Aksakallı’s orders.
Those detained included Col. Ümit Bak, Lt. Col. Mehmet Ali Çelik, Chief Master Sgt. Turgay Usanmaz, Chief Master Sgt. Şenol Soylu and Chief Master Sgt. Muzaffer Han.
7:40 a.m.: Special Forces headquarters was declared clear of personnel suspected of supporting the coup attempt.
10:38 a.m.: Aksakallı arrived at the barracks in an armored vehicle provided by MİT official Eskintan and resumed command.
According to the account, he kissed Halisdemir’s forehead and congratulated Atmaca for helping regain control of the headquarters.
“Well done, my lion,” Aksakallı reportedly told Atmaca.
CHRONOLOGY SHOULD BEGIN ON JULY 14, WRITER SAYS
The writer argues that the chronology of the coup attempt should begin with the events of July 14 rather than with Major O.K.’s report to MİT on the afternoon of July 15.
According to the writer, understanding the events requires answers to several questions, including why the graduation ceremony was moved to July 14, why a parachute training program planned for July 15 was canceled, why Akar and Fidan attended the ceremony despite established practice and what they discussed during their private meetings.
The writer also questions why Aksakallı remained at an unidentified residence for much of the night while ordering other commanders and personnel to go to Gölbaşı.
During that period, Aksakallı communicated with MİT officials and television networks, discussed calling civilians into the streets with the prime minister and directed operations at Special Forces headquarters by telephone.
He did not arrive at the Oğulbey Barracks until 10:38 a.m. on July 16.
