A TR724 program published on July 23, 2020, examined the role of Gen. Metin Gürak, a senior Turkish military officer promoted at the Supreme Military Council, in the events of Turkey’s July 15, 2016 coup attempt and questioned why he faced no legal consequences despite appearing in several critical parts of the night’s chain of events.
The discussion formed part of TR724’s broader scrutiny of the official July 15 narrative, which the outlet has repeatedly described as a politically managed process rather than a conventional military coup attempt.
Ankara blames the coup attempt on the Gülen movement, a transnational civic initiative inspired by Islamic scholar Fethullah Gülen, and designates the movement as a terrorist organization. The movement denies involvement.
Gürak’s mission to Etimesgut questioned
The program said that after then-National Intelligence Organization (MİT) chief Hakan Fidan met then-Chief of General Staff Hulusi Akar at military headquarters on July 15, two immediate measures emerged: military flights were to be restricted and officers were sent to military aviation and armored units.
According to the discussion, then-Land Forces Commander Gen. Salih Zeki Çolak was sent to the Army Aviation School Command, while Gürak was sent to the Etimesgut Armored Units School and Training Division.
The speakers said these steps appeared to target the two symbols most associated with a coup: aircraft in the sky and tanks in the streets.
But the program argued that Gürak’s mission was strange because Etimesgut was a training school, not the main operational armored unit that would be expected to put tanks on the streets. The speakers said the more relevant combat unit was in Mamak and was under the command responsibility of Lt. Gen. Metin İyidil.
The program said Gürak warned personnel in Etimesgut that no armored unit should go out into Ankara, but did not issue the same direct warning to the unit he himself commanded in Mamak.
It compared the situation to sending someone to warn a neighbor that a burglar might enter, while failing to secure his own house next door.
Armored vehicles created coup image, speakers say
The program said 38 armored vehicles later appeared on the streets of Ankara, but only eight reached the General Staff headquarters. The others, according to the speakers, were left scattered on roads after mechanical interference, including brake-line damage.
The speakers argued that this created the visual impression of tanks and armored vehicles moving through the capital, without producing an effective military seizure of power.
They said some armored vehicles carried plastic training rounds rather than live ammunition, which they argued supported the idea that the movement was designed to complete the image of a coup rather than carry out a functional takeover.
The program said this mattered because tanks in the streets became one of the strongest images used to convince the public that a military coup was underway.
Metin İyidil punished, Gürak promoted
The program contrasted Gürak’s treatment with that of Lt. Gen. Metin İyidil, who was later arrested and convicted even though, according to the speakers, units directly under his control did not carry out the kind of operational action attributed to him.
İyidil was briefly released by an appeals court before being rearrested after intense political and media reaction. Judges who ordered his release later faced investigation.
The speakers said Gürak, by contrast, was not prosecuted, disciplined or sidelined. Instead, he later became deputy chief of general staff and was sent to Libya, a posting the program described as politically sensitive and indicative of Erdoğan’s trust.
The panel argued that this contrast raised a central question: Why was İyidil punished harshly while Gürak, whose name appeared in critical parts of the night’s armored-unit activity, continued to rise?
Name in alleged appointment list
The program also discussed claims that Gürak’s name appeared in lists attributed to the alleged coup plotters, including as a prospective commander of Gülhane Military Medical Academy, known as GATA.
The speakers said many officers whose names appeared in such lists were arrested and tried, including people who were physically unable to take part in the coup attempt. They cited the example of a brigadier general injured in a helicopter crash before July 15 who was nevertheless prosecuted because his name appeared in alleged coup documents.
Gürak, they said, faced no comparable process.
According to the program, Gürak later explained that his name may have appeared in relation to GATA because he frequently visited the military hospital in his capacity as Ankara garrison commander. The speakers said that explanation was accepted for him, while others were not granted similar benefit of the doubt.
Program says absence of a coup plan remains central
The discussion also addressed a broader issue in the July 15 cases: the absence of a coherent coup plan.
The speakers cited later prosecutorial language saying investigators could not identify a complete coup plan because, in their view, the aim was not a classic military takeover but the creation of chaos and the removal of Erdoğan.
The program rejected that explanation, arguing that the absence of a coup plan was better understood as evidence that there was no conventional coup attempt.
The speakers said a small number of troops were mobilized, many young soldiers and cadets did not know what was happening and several deployments appeared designed to create images rather than produce military control.
They cited official figures indicating that only a small fraction of the Turkish Armed Forces was involved in the night’s events, arguing that this was inconsistent with an organized coup by a network allegedly preparing for decades.
Gürak case presented as part of larger July 15 pattern
The program presented Gürak’s case as part of a wider pattern in which some officers were prosecuted regardless of what they actually did on July 15, while others in strategically important positions were protected or promoted.
The speakers argued that the crucial question was not only what officers did that night, but whose actions were later interpreted as evidence of guilt and whose were treated as legitimate or ignored.
They said Gürak’s later assignment to Libya was especially notable because Libya had become one of Erdoğan’s most sensitive foreign and military files, involving security commitments, military coordination and wider political interests.
The video below presents the TR724 discussion on Gen. Metin Gürak, his July 15 role, the movement of armored units in Ankara, the prosecution of Metin İyidil and Gürak’s later rise within the Turkish military.
