A list of questions compiled by critics of Ankara’s account of Turkey’s July 15, 2016 coup attempt highlights alleged gaps in the official timeline, including what senior officials knew before the violence began, why key military and intelligence decisions were made and whether defendants received fair trials.
Critics argue that answers to these questions are necessary to understand whether Turkish authorities had prior knowledge of the events or failed to act on available intelligence.
The questions include the following:
If the coup attempt was directed against President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, why did it begin before he was located or captured? If his location could not be found, why did the attempt continue?
Why were Erdoğan’s aides-de-camp, who would normally know where the president was going and what he planned to do, not with him that day? Why was his location allegedly kept from them?
Why did the National Intelligence Organization (MİT), which received a warning earlier that day, not inform Erdoğan? If it did inform him, why did Erdoğan initially say he learned about the coup attempt from his brother-in-law?
Why has Erdoğan given different times in different accounts for when he says he learned about the coup attempt from his brother-in-law?
Erdoğan’s brother-in-law said he called at around 10:30 p.m., while Erdoğan initially said he was informed at around 9:30 p.m. Could the one-hour discrepancy be related to a time zone issue, as some critics have alleged?
Why did Special Forces Commander Lt. Gen. Zekai Aksakallı summon Brig. Gen. Semih Terzi to Ankara, and why was Terzi killed after arriving there?
Why was Noncommissioned Officer Ömer Halisdemir, who killed Terzi on Aksakallı’s order, later shot dead by Maj. Mihrali Atmaca? What orders were given before that shooting?
What was the purpose of bombing parliament on the night of the coup attempt?
Why was the coup attempt launched before all communications were cut off?
If the movement led by Fethullah Gülen, which Ankara blames for the coup attempt, carried it out, why did thousands of people later dismissed over alleged Gülen links not provide support that night?
Why was the ByLock messaging application, which Turkish authorities later treated as key evidence of Gülen movement membership, not found on many soldiers accused of taking part in the coup attempt?
If the soldiers had access to ByLock, why did they use WhatsApp that night?
How was the public mobilized on the night of the coup attempt, and was such organization normal in an event described as spontaneous?
How were hundreds of trucks loaded with excavation materials brought in front of military barracks that night?
Why were autopsies not performed on some of those who died?
Claims were made that people who appeared to be civilians opened fire on the public. Why were those claims not fully investigated?
If hundreds of pilots were later arrested as coup plotters, why did only a small number of planes and helicopters appear to take part in the events?
Why did Special Forces personnel, described as among the most trained units in the military, not detain any senior politicians or officials who could oppose the coup attempt?
Erdoğan said “three planes were waiting for me that evening.” Why were they waiting, and did this indicate prior knowledge of a possible emergency?
Erdoğan was said to have been teaching the Quran to his grandchild that evening, and photos were later published. Where were those photos taken? Was there such a library at the place where he was staying, or were the photos taken elsewhere?
Since the police did not join the coup attempt, why was public intervention needed against the soldiers involved? Could police forces not have detained the limited number of soldiers?
Why did the soldiers involved not cut internet access by targeting fiber optic infrastructure instead of bombing parliament?
Defendants have testified that then Chief of General Staff Gen. Hulusi Akar appeared calm at Akıncı Air Base. If there was no visible sign in footage that his hands were tied or that violence was used against him, where did the mark on his neck come from?
Why was MİT chief Hakan Fidan at General Staff headquarters around 8:30 p.m. on the day of the coup attempt? Why was he not detained there if the coup plotters knew he was present?
What was the logic behind attempting to take over the Presidential Complex, a heavily guarded site, with a small number of soldiers?
Why did the 2nd Army, which said it did not take part in the coup attempt, not intervene against soldiers who had closed one side of the Bosphorus Bridge, despite its proximity?
If the soldiers involved could not find Erdoğan, why did they not try to locate him through phone signals, a method commonly used in criminal investigations?
Why were the judges who released Adil Öksüz dismissed seven or eight months later rather than immediately, given that judges and prosecutors were removed quickly in many other post-coup cases?
Why were claims made by defendants in court not investigated more thoroughly instead of being dismissed in advance as false?
How could defendants receive a fair trial while the president, the prime minister and pro-government media outlets repeatedly described them as guilty before verdicts were issued? How could judges rule in favor of defendants under such public and political pressure?
